


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CIA/SAVA /WVIND 720617



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 17 June 1972



NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

For the President Only

~~*Top Secret*~~



SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1972
Weekly average for each month




MARCH 1972 — JUNE 1972
Weekly data as reported

US BATTLE DEATHS increased to 8 from last week's 6.




rose to 478 from the 408 of last week. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.




include four special purpose groups totaling 602 personnel. The estimate of infiltrators destined for Cambodia-South Vietnam since 1 October 1971 is now some 119,900 - 121,900.

ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS jumped to 455 from the 142 of last week.




ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION dropped from last week's 3,719 to 3,133.



SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS

as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces declined to 98% from the previous week's 99%.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

In South Vietnam, the level of contact was fairly high in the northern Delta, though it slackened off somewhat toward the end of the week. The 5th VC Division (formerly deployed in MR 3) has been responsible for much of the enemy action in this area and has apparently taken heavy losses in the operation -- which is its first foray into MR 4. Elsewhere, the relative lull of the past several weeks in enemy-initiated activity has continued. In most major combat areas, the South Vietnamese have concentrated on expanding their defensive perimeters and have carried out limited offensive and probing operations against enemy forces. Communist units, however, continue to make preparations for further attacks around Hue, Kontum, Phu My (Binh Dinh Province), and now Kien Tuong and Dinh Tuong Provinces in the Delta.

The military situation in Laos was essentially quiet during the week, although a slight increase in enemy activity occurred northeast of Luang Prabang. Government forces in south Laos are making slow progress in a new operation designed to retake Khong Sedone. The government's campaign to recapture territory southwest of the Plain of Jars also picked up some momentum after having been stalled for several weeks.

In Cambodia, action was light throughout most of the country. After 11 days of intermittent fighting, government forces reopened Route 7 between Skoun and Kompong Cham City. In the Phnom Penh area, FANK launched ten minor clearing operations on the outskirts of the city in an effort to disrupt enemy elements that have been harassing the capital.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

Personnel infiltration continues at the low level to be expected at this time of year. The acceptance of some 600 personnel during the week raises the estimate of NVN infiltrators destined for Cambodia and South Vietnam since 1 October 1971 to 119,200-121,900.

25X1X1

Despite U.S. interdiction efforts and worsening weather in Laos and Cambodia, the Communists continue to move materiel southward. As evidence of the magnitude of Hanoi's road resupply effort in the north, almost all of the 1,500 trucks in the truck parks at Dong Dang had

between 12 May and 7 June. Such suggest an unusually high level of use during the period. At the other end of the system, enemy vehicular traffic along supply routes in Laos and Cambodia has been frequently disrupted in recent days by heavy rains, but the Communists -- as they have done in other years -- are increasingly turning to waterways to float supplies southward.

25X1X1

25X1X6

25X1C

Communist Political Developments

25X1X6

Hanoi and the Viet Cong have worked out a new position on negotiations -- a position markedly different from their present one.

Sometime between now and early 1973 the Communist leadership would be willing to accept a solution which would involve the total withdrawal of U.S. troops, the release of all U.S. prisoners, and a political agreement which would allow President Thieu to remain in office.


25X1X6

We have no other evidence to substantiate this report, and it is open to question whether

Nevertheless, there is no evidence

25X1X6

that the report is a fabrication, and if it is, it is a skillful one.



25X1X6

~~Top Secret~~